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Longing, Belonging and the Politics of Naming: The Case
of the Khache

Anisa Bhutia

In Tibet, Muslim traders and subsequent
settlers from Kashmir were called Khache.
Over the years, this term has come to acquire
multiple significations. By engaging with the
complex history of the group and their eventual
return to Kashmir, this paper tries to uncover
these very significations and how the idea
of Khache represents a coming together of
the Himalayan region (Tibet, Nepal, Kashmir,
Darjeeling, Kalimpong). In their multi-layered
notion of belonging, there is a strong sense of
attachment to the imagined Tibet, reflecting
a harmoniously lived life, while further
complexities emerge from their repatriation
to the ancestral land of Kashmir. Referred to
as Kashmiri Muslims (loosely, Khache) in Tibet,
and now as Tibetan Muslims in Kashmir, the
confusion in identity is as much linguistic as
political. We should also note that regional
prefixes such as ‘Tibetan’ or ‘Kashmiri’ do not

just fixate associations with regions, but also
with regimes of power and powerful agents.
As such, through this article I am trying to
argue for a geographically and politically
neutral or at least less problematic term,
Khache. Finally, this paper is an ethnographic
examination of how different representations
and regional influences can be witnessed in
everyday life performances for this group,
and how these ultimately shape their sense
of being. In the same vein, we will locate
Islam emerging as a constant and source of
justification to life’s trials and tribulations—
as often portrayed by the analogy to hijrat—
the journey to save one’s religion.
Keywords: Khache, region, religion, belonging, Islam, Tibet.
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Introduction
Friend: Happy Losar, Anisa.
Me: Thank you, same to you.
Suddenly I turn and ask: Why did you wish me a happy Losar?
Friend: Aren’t you Tibetan Muslim?
Me: Yes I am. But I don’t celebrate Losar. I celebrate Eid.
The above encounter was with a friend in the year 2000
when I was attending school in Kalimpong. Even as a child,
the assumption that I would celebrate Losar, a Buddhist
new year festival associated with the first day of the
lunisolar Tibetan calendar, was something that discomforted me. The prefix Tibetan had always been a part of
my identity and my answer to the question ‘who are you’
had always been: Tibetan Muslim, almost like an instant
reflex. Eid was the only festival that my family celebrated,
but I knew about Losar due to the large Tibetan Buddhist
settlements in Kalimpong. The uneasiness of the conversation with my friend and the need to further clarify what
I meant at that time as a child has become a more complex
process of deconstruction of identity in the years that
have followed.
		 *

*

*

This article tries to argue that it is critical to engage with
how we name a group or community, by elaborating the
case of the so-called ‘Tibetan Muslims’ who settled in
Kashmir. Indeed, for such a people who have moved back
and forth over regions (Kashmir-Tibet-Kashmir) and have
a complex sense of history and identity, I argue that there
should be an attempt to avoid spatially-fixating categories, as it poses problems like those which I will discuss
as the paper proceeds. We should also note that regional
prefixes such as ‘Tibetan’ or ‘Kashmiri’ do not just fixate
associations with regions, but also with regimes of power
and powerful agents. As such, through this article I am
trying to argue for a geographically and politically neutral
or at least less problematic term Khache. I believe this term
absorbs the complex historicity, identity of movement,
and the different relationalities of space and time that the
above-mentioned community has lived. In this way I am
also trying to challenge the idea of regions as politically
and cartographically formed alone. Rather, I argue that
they are also formed through the complex mobility of
people and their social and cultural practices.
The journey for this research began in 2012 with my
master’s dissertation in cultural studies; I started to critically engage with the community’s history and identity.
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Since then, numerous visits to Kalimpong, Dharamshala
and Kashmir have helped me gain insights about how these
groups of people are held together or not. Many instances
outlined in the following sections made me question as
to how and whether at all, one could call this group a
community. I realised during fieldwork that, though being
spatially dispersed, there is a strong feeling of community
among the members of the group. Kalimpong, Darjeeling,
Srinagar, Ladakh, Nepal, and even Saudi Arabia and Turkey
are some of the areas which they now call home, besides
of course, Central Tibet, still, for some (Shah 2012: 51, 59;
Altner 2010: 70; Rai 2010; Butt 1994: 16). Despite all these
different locations, there seems to be a sense of solidarity
among all the ‘Tibetan Muslims’ having an intertwined
history with different regions of Tibet, Kashmir, and many
others. At present, the most significant population of the
group is settled in Srinagar, in Eidgah and Hawal Colonies,
the two spaces which I frequented during my stay in
Kashmir. It is important to note here that the situations for
the Khache located in other parts of the world might not
be similar to the ones that I encountered in Srinagar. The
arguments in this article are based in my fieldwork in 2015
and the descriptions are locally situated in the politics of
Kashmir at that time.
Based on an ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the year
2015 over a span of six months, the data were primarily
obtained through participant observation and in-depth
interviews with members of my community. During my
fieldwork, I saw the complications that the movement has
brought for this group in Kashmir. They formed their sense
of belonging to either being a Tibetan, or Kashmiri, and
most commonly, a Muslim. Amidst the many differences,
one of the few commonalities that the group in Srinagar
stands united for is the term Khache; as, when and how this
very term gets translated, so do their politics. By introducing the term Khache to the academic discourse instead
of ‘Tibetan Muslims’, I do not mean to say these people
are not Tibetan. Rather, it is an attempt to underscore the
point that Tibetan cultural habits—specifically language,
food, dress, and also common nostalgia—may as well
apply to people who follow the religion of Islam (i.e. not
just Buddhism), people who may have more complicated
histories and stories of movement. Additionally, till date,
there has been no debate or discussions as to when the
term ‘Tibetan Muslim’ came to be used. Is Tibetan Muslim
a direct translation of the term Khache? These are some
questions that need a more in-depth examination than just
the history of the community. With the deconstruction
and symbolic investigation of the term, I am hoping to
intervene in the academic process of naming communities.

Probably, it can also be looked as a way of rethinking the
different categories that this group presents—Tibetan,
Muslim, and Kashmiri.
Khache: Understanding, Engaging, and Exploring the
Meanings
My enquiry to understand the names used for Muslims in
Tibet during my fieldwork in Kashmir attracted diverse
responses. Most of the common iterations were Lhasa
Khache or Singpa Khache. A closer examination of the term
with my respondents on the meaning of Khache revealed
other purposes that this word contained. Tibetan ka means
big, and che implies mouth, translating to a ‘talkative
person’. As the Khache were traders and consequently,
extensive travelers, they had a lot of stories to share with
the natives of Tibet; according to my analysis of the term
it might be possible that they were considered particularly
talkative or boastful. Further, Khache can be described as
the Kashmiris of Lhasa, who came from Kashmir either
directly, or via Ladakh. The term is also attributed to have
its origin in the Persian word khwaja used for a respectable
man, a wealthy merchant (Gaborieau 1995: 21). Thus, in the
dominant discourse Khache primarily refers to the people
who came from Kashmir.
In Tibetan there are many terms, which represent the
Islamic Empire or its people. “The most important ones are
stag gzig, par sig, khrom/phrom and kha che” (Akasoy, Burnett,
and Yoeli-Tlalim 2011: 2-3). All these terms are highly
contested and do not have only one singular meaning and
they were discovered at the beginning of the twentieth
century from the Mogao caves at Dunhuang (ibid). In the
Dunhuang manuscript,1 in the ninth century there was a
mention of ‘Kha che’ silk but whether it meant ‘Kashmiri’
or ‘Muslim’ in general is not clear (ibid: 4). Some scholars
have shown that Muslims from northern India and Nepal
were also called Khache (Jest 1995: 8). But who the Khache
are still remains a question. One of my respondents has
noted, “some people came from Kashmir to Tibet to preach
Buddhism, they also had a prefix of Khache to their name.”
The term perhaps, meant to refer to people who were from
Kashmir but coincidently, the Kashmiris who visited Tibet
were mostly Muslims. Hence, in due course of time, Khache
became synonymous with Kashmiri Muslims. Further, it
has been legitimized due to the everyday vocabulary of
the people. But it is important to note here that Khache is a
subjective term, whose meaning might differ from people
to people, from period to period.
Moving on to the word Khache’s many associations in
central Tibet’s society and culture, there are records of

the presence of the term in Tibet since the Fifth Dalai
Lama (1617-1682). It is believed that it was the Fifth Dalai
Lama who granted them land to build a mosque and a
cemetery (Bhutia 2016: 03; Prince Peter of Greece and
Denmark 2011: 238; Butt 2005; Jest 1995: 8). The Khache
ling-ka—the Garden of the Kashmiri—is deemed to be
where the first mosque was built in Tibet (Jest 1995: 8,
Altner 2010: 66). Various Muslim communities had settled
in Tibet, and the most prominent among them were the
Hui and the Khache. Altner (2011: 346) argues that Muslims
in Chinese are called as Keshe, and Khache is perhaps a
derivative of the term. Muslims were actively involved
in society and even contributed to the Tibetan economy,
culture and literature (Singh 2015: 8, Altner 2010: 6768). The nangma, a high-pitched lilting song, is believed
to have been developed by the Muslims of Tibet. Some
scholars believe that it has its origins in the Urdu word
naghma which means melody (Geoffrey, n.d: 13-19). Even
this claim is contested, as some believe that the Tibetans
generated it. Mr. Lobsang Samten, Senior Art Director of
the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts opined that, “If
we look at the history, the people who performed in the
court in the early days were Tibetan Muslims. Therefore,
I believe there is a relation between nangma and naghma.”
He named some of the nangma singers like Irfanlah
Rehman and the first nangma singer named Yishi, who
were ethnically Khache. Another important contribution
of the Khache has been on the literature front through
a scripture titled - “Khache Phalu’s Advice on the art of
living” (Khache Phalu’s 1987). Though there are contestations on its authorship, it is a book that is known to most
Tibetan households. It was initially written in the Tibetan
script and Professor Dawa Norbu, credited for the English
translation of the book, also believes that it was written
by a Khache person. The word Khache, thus, embraces
Tibetan-ness without having to spell it out as such, while
also maintaining its distinct (and mysterious) character.
The word Khache opens up possibilities for trans-regional
representation and affective dimensions.
Khache and the Ummah: Coming Together of Regions
Before the 1950s in Tibet, there was no requirement of
choosing a nationality and the idea of citizenship had
not developed. Traders and travelers “moved as easily
between identities as one did through the mountain
passes” (Khan 2015: 66). As such, the trading communities
such as the Khache, by their movement and settlement
were already bringing various regions together into
new geographies by their socio-cultural, narrative, and
affective practices. History for this region is, thus, also
connected. It is important to note that regions should
HIMALAYA Volume 38, Number 2 | 29

not be seen as something artificial but as an active agent
shaping the social, economic and political processes of
the world (Scargill 1985: 139). Further, regions are formed
through its networks, relations and connections (Allen
and Cochrane 2007: 1162).
In case of the Khache the complex historicity and geography that had formed around the community through
their movements got further complicated after the Chinese
invasion of Tibet after 1950s. Freedom of religion being
taken away, many people moved from Tibet to other
areas. The Khache in particular again had to move, this
time towards ‘their ancestral place of Kashmir’. On the
route from Tibet to Kashmir, they stopped in the eastern
Himalayan town of Kalimpong for around six months
during the 1960s before moving on. The relocation to
Kashmir was decided by the Poonj/Panch (five) committee,2
a group formed during the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama
to take care of the administrative affairs of the Muslims
in Tibet (Singh 2015: 05; Naik 1995: 32; Butt 1994). Most
of the members of the community settled in Kashmir but
some came back to the Himalayan towns of Kalimpong and
Darjeeling in the Indian state of West Bengal; a sizeable
number also went to Nepal. In this way, the Khache spread
throughout the Himalayan belt. A group whose history
was primarily formed by the trade routes of the Himalayan
regions ultimately spread out again into all these different
regions. Although the majority of the Khache have relocated to Srinagar, there may be some in other parts of the
world as well. Like in the past, this group has settled and
taken certain traits from the local culture and created
an almost peculiar way of living that spans across the
Himalaya from Tibet to Nepal and beyond, thus bringing
together multiple regions.
The stories of movement, place making and relocation,
which shaped the Khache’s identity, makes the history
of the group a deeply connected one spanning across
different time, space, and regimes. These connections have
shaped the community’s sense of belonging and have been
sustained and performed in different forms even today. A
member of the group in Kalimpong would be well aware
about what is happening in Kashmir. Similarly, the people
in Kashmir would know about the Khache’s in Nepal and
these connections span further to Dubai, Tibet, Turkey,
and many other places, some of which I am probably not
even aware of. “We Tibetan Muslims have relatives all
over. We still have family in Lhasa, Ladakh, Kashmir, and
in Kalimpong and Darjeeling. It is only geographically that
we are apart; otherwise we are all the same, culturally
and religiously” (Sherpa 2018). Having similar sentiments,
some of my respondents in Kashmir mentioned, “Now due

30 | HIMALAYA Fall 2018

to strict rules and regulations from the Chinese government, it is difficult for us to contact our people in Tibet
easily. Still whenever we get a chance we try to call and
talk even if it is only for 30 seconds or so.” The 30 second
call then becomes the talking point amidst all the members
of the group, almost acting like a shared connectivity for
the community as a whole.
This shared connectivity gets mobilized through enactments of different functions, conversations, foods, dress,
language, which create a sense of solidarity. During
weddings one can see women wearing chuba (Tibetan
dress), covering their heads with scarf and wearing ghau
(necklace). One can almost sense the feeling of pride while
my respondents reflected on their connected histories. All
these are different forms of an intentional creation of a
collective ummah (community) across different geographical and political borders which gets problematized when
we try to fix them with a certain national categorization
like ‘Tibetan’ or ‘Kashmiri’. Since the early twentieth
century, both these regions (Tibet and Kashmir) have
experienced complex contentions, which have shaped
their respective trajectories. To categorize the Khache as
either ‘Tibetan or Kashmiri’, further confuses and complicates their already complex historicity. Also, to categorize
them with these national prefixes denies their intentionality and agency to enact a transnational existence. This
reminds us of Schneiderman’s (2010: 292) discussion of the
Thangmi performing multi-agent negotiations and cross
border existences while also remaining ‘ungoverned’. Like
the Thangmi, we probably need a term that can accommodate both intentionality and agency. I suggest Khache could
be one such term.
Messy States: Khache and the Fatigue of Being InBetween
The group has been represented differently over time by
agents in various positions of power, privilege, and access
to knowledge. Some of my own early stepping-stones in
researching the community have been through works of
high scholarly value, contributed by well-meaning scholars
to whom I remain eternally grateful. But their representation of the community, that had once seemed innocent,
started to register as highly problematic once I was in
Kashmir, talking to my respondents. In the following
subsection, I will try to show how. Furthermore, engaging
with the highly negotiated relocation of the group to India,
we will come across some more representations made by
state agents during the process, which reveal a deeper
geopolitical power play. The rehabilitation in Jammu and
Kashmir state was not smooth and simple either. As such I

will discuss the contentious topic of ‘Jammu and Kashmir
state subjectship’, and the discordant and often-contradictory language of representation and action towards
the resettled community by the federal and central state
agents themselves. This excavates the messiness of central
and state-unity bringing forth the nested complications of
Jammu and Kashmir region’s politics.
Scholarly Representations
One of the first works on the Khache was by Marc
Gaborieau, called Récit d’un voyageur Mussulman au Tibet
(Story of a Muslim traveler in Tibet) (Muhammad 1973),
written in French, primarily a travelogue of Ghulam
Muhammad. Gaborieau also wrote the introduction to the
special issue of the Tibet Journal (1995), published by the
Library of Tibetan Work and Archives, Dharamshala, on
‘Tibetan Muslims’. Here he defines the Tibetan Muslims
as any Muslims who ‘are in some way or other connected
with Tibet’, irrespective of whether they live in Tibet
proper or outside. According to this definition, the Muslim
settlers in Srinagar may be called Tibetan Muslims. A
similar view is put forward by David Atwill (2016) who
focuses on their Tibetan heritage and history of living in
Lhasa ‘for generations’. In effect, such lingering nostalgia
of the lived life in Tibet also pervades their everyday, as I
encountered and elaborate in the ensuing sections. But the
romantic view of the Muslim as harmoniously and happily
embedded in local Tibetan society is problematized and
challenged by Andrew Fischer (2005). Siddiqui (1991) and
Sheikh (1991) present a compact idea of the history of
this group of people before 1959 and there-after. Another
important reference is the book Tibet and Tibetan Muslim
(2004) written originally in Urdu by Amir Ud-din Nadwi,
who is a member of the community, still living in Srinagar
but not in the ‘Tibetan Colonies’, the place where they
(Khache) are located at present in Srinagar, Kashmir.
The definition of ‘Tibetan Muslim’ given by Gaborieau
(1995: 3) has a nostalgic sense of rootedness in Tibet. But
it does not question the complications of citizenship and
belonging that the contemporary period brings forth
for such transnational groups. In my understanding,
the term ‘Tibetan’ Muslim, might suggest a peaceful
Shangri-la—accommodative of the different religion in
Tibet—may hold value, sentimental or otherwise, for
the one who represents. But the same prefix takes on a
completely different meaning when it travels to other
regions and regimes such as Kashmir, together with the
people represented as such. In the local Kashmiri context,
the term applied to the settler in their colonies takes
on a different connotation and trajectory altogether,

suggesting a different identity (‘outsiders’) and belonging.
This complicates their integration within a society and
territory that they claim and value as their ancestral land,
and leads to a fragmented community life, as I will later
explain. At this point, it will not be unfair to reflect, with
care, on the process of naming, the privileges, interests,
and even limitations of the ones who name (this surely
includes me and members of the community who project
particular representations that I will elaborate below), the
claims that we, as scholars, make, and thus, to meditate
on the messy afterlives of our own representations and
produced knowledge.
The frequent visit of scholars questioning and their inconvenient categorization has made my respondents wary.
During our free-flowing conversation, one of my respondents mentioned, “We are only answering you because
you are one of us and look like us, we are fed up with the
questions from researchers and everyone else that wants
to know our history.” Another respondent further heightened this fatigued spirit, almost getting irritated when I
mentioned I am working on Tibetan Muslims. He retorted,
“There are no Tibetan Muslims in Kashmir; if you want to
study the Tibetan Muslims, you need to go to Tibet.” When
I first went into the field, like the aforementioned scholars,
I had similar idealized notions of a cherished Tibet being
lived in a harmonious community life in Srinagar. But such
testimonies were the first jolts, which made me realize
the underlying tensions and deeply-rooted complications
that this community was negotiating in Kashmir. I further
realized that the politics of identity and names resulted
in fragments within the community, confusion regarding
state subjectship, local popular perceptions of the Khache
as outsiders even in their believed ancestral place. It
further translated into real everyday problems such as
restricted access to higher education, lack of employment,
and restrictions on buying land. Let me turn to a more
elaborate discussion about this in the following sections.
Ambiguity of Governance: White Papers and State
Subject
“India’s Traders Held by Chinese”, 3 read an article in
August 1959 in the New York Times in the backdrop of
a very animated dialogue between the Indian and the
Chinese governments. These negotiations centered
around the 129 families of Muslim settlers in Tibet, who
were eventually relocated by the Indian Government and
given shelter in Srinagar. One of the most critical documents that record these negotiations is a series of notes,
letters, and memoranda collectively called the White
Papers I and II (1959).
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An examination of the White Papers reveals an important
dialogue between the two emerging regional powers,
trying to assert themselves geopolitically. Both the
governments of China and India tried to claim the status of
the group being either Tibetan or Kashmiri, respectively,
their respective interest being deftly embedded in the
language and names they employed. The category that the
Indian state used was ‘Muslims of Indian Origin Residing at
Lhasa and Other Places of Tibet for Trade Purpose’, while
the Chinese negotiators claimed that they were ‘Tibetan
people of the People’s Republic of China, living under the
local administration for generations’. This was a crucial
geopolitical moment, indeed. It was Nehru’s administration that finally clinched the negotiation, allowing them
to relocate and arranged for their rehabilitation in ‘the
valley of Kashmir’. Many of my respondents opined that it
was the time of “hindi chini, bhai bhai [India and China are
like brothers]”—two new neighboring republics founded
on left-leaning ideals, seeking mutual co-operation) and
they were hence brought back to their ‘ancestral land of
Kashmir’. It may be fruitful to remember, at this stage,
that since the first half of the twentieth century, Kashmir,
being in a strategic geopolitical location in between
Central and South Asia has been embroiled in a peculiar
and bitter conflict between various contending parties
including India, China, and Pakistan (Guha 2008). By
claiming the Khache as ‘Indian Citizens’ through the narrative of their ‘Kashmiri ancestry’ and by China agreeing,
the Khache’s ‘repatriation’ may be interpreted as a geopolitical attempt by the Indian state in its process to claim
Kashmir as part of India conclusively, that is, through
international bureaucracy and documents. Indeed, the
repatriation allowed these Muslim families to escape religious repression, like many of my respondents mentioned,
and provided the community with documentary claim of
ancestry and rehabilitation in Kashmir, validated by the
Indian central state. But at the same time, we note how,
through these bureaucratic negotiations, the history,
identity, and destiny of these Khache families were being
(re)drawn and negotiated, through evolving categories.
In these notes and letters exchanges the term Khache/
Kachi got systematically translated as Kashmiri Muslims
in the realm of the central Indian Government.4 As these
families of ‘Kashmiri Muslims’ were escorted into India
and provided with Indian citizenship, they were subsequently allocated some land (first in Eidgah then in the
Hawal neighborhood) in Srinagar, under a lease with the
promise of ownership transfer after 20 years. In the public
documents issued by the Jammu and Kashmir government,
however, we encounter the significant addition of ‘Tibetan
Refugees’, after the Indian state-prescribed term ‘Kashmiri
32 | HIMALAYA Fall 2018

Muslims’. Further, while the Jammu and Kashmir civil
secretary’s plot allotment sanction for rehabilitation in
Sangeen Darwaza, Hawal read ‘Kashmiri Muslim Tibetan
Refugees’, the public hoarding of the site for the housing
colony eliminated the term ‘Kashmiri Muslim’ altogether
with a declaration in bold, ‘SITE FOR HOUSING COLONY OF
TIBETIAN REFUGEES, J&K Housing Board’(sic). In fact, even
today, these neighborhoods that they are settled in, are
locally referred to as the ‘Tibetan Refugee Colony’. There is
a predominant popular perception of them being Tibetan
and their colonies regarded as the places where one can
get momos (dumplings). The resulting situation, as the
reader would imagine, is one of tension and confusion.
Another important site of such contestation is the question of the ‘Jammu and Kashmir State Subjectship’, which
results from Jammu and Kashmir’s special autonomous
status within the Indian Constitution. It is an exclusive
political identity, also called Permanent Residency,
which grants people of the Jammu and Kashmir state the
ownership of lands, access to higher education, jobs, and
other such state privileges and has come to be regarded
as proof for ancestry and origin. It is worthwhile at this
stage, to emphasize the thorny relations between Jammu
and Kashmir state and the Indian central government as it
has evolved over decades of war, violence, and increasing
surveillance and control. The volatility of the political
situation and the underlying tension between regimes
surfaces frequently in the everyday working of bureaucracy and government, as was apparent in the discordant
language-use in the case of housing and rehabilitation that
we just encountered.
The question of state subjectship heightens the politics of
belonging for communities like these relocated Muslims
from Tibet, whose ancestry cannot be easily established.
On the one hand there is the White Paper, issued by the
central India state, which confirms their Kashmiri ancestry
and supports their claim to being regarded as Kashmiri.
On the other, most of them lack Kashmiri State subject
papers, which makes their territorial belonging dubious
and vulnerable before local state authorities (Bhutia 2017).
The problem then, is one of authority and legitimacy of
the right to affirm ancestry and belonging, and lies at
the core of the evolving relations between the local and
central governments claiming stake in Kashmir. Let us
consider the case in 2014, when the names of members
of the community were suddenly struck down from the
local voter’s list by the area’s election authority, on the
grounds of non-possession of state subject papers. It came
as a rude shock to many of my respondents as they and
their ancestors had been casting votes since 1960s, I was

told. It was only after several rounds of explanation from
several members and showing of earlier voters’ lists and
Indian nationality documents, that the voting rights were
re-instated again by the officer. Similar confusion occurs
also with the subject of the buying of land and property,
applying for higher education, seeking employment in
public offices, etc. Needless to say, this severely restricts
social and economic mobility, and limits options to
improve livelihoods (Shah 2012: 62).
Further, another such incident which shows the uncertain
conditions that the group is living has been mentioned
below, where one person from the community had gone to
register for a ration card:
The authority who was issuing the Ration Card was
from Ladakh. Being a Ladakhi, he knows that the
Tibetans do not have state subject. He refused the
application of the Tibetans on the grounds of them
not being a State Subject... Technically speaking we
do not have any rights whatsoever if it comes to
us for staying here. Right now because they don’t
know about us so somehow we get by. Somehow
we manage. Some of the students get admissions in
the university to study, sometimes they ask for the
state subject, and as we do not have that they show
the ration card. If a person applies the law we do
not have any verification. (Pervez Sheikh, 45, Male,
Hawal, 16th September 2015)5
Like the issue of ration cards, another such incident took
place in the late 1990s; when some community members
were denied passports. Narrating the incident, one of
the respondents, who lives near the colony mentioned,
“In order to separate us from the other Tibetans who are
refugees, the government had to do a survey to clarify the
descendants of the heads of the family mentioned in the
white paper, in order to be sure that they were handing
the passport to the right people.”
Further, there are continuous interactions with the
Tibetan Government in Exile, formally called as Central
Tibetan Administration (CTA) through the visits by the
Dalai Lama to the Eidgah and Hawal colonies, and the
presence of local institutions like the Tibetan Public
School, Men tsee-khang (the Tibetan Medicine Institute,
established in the form of a small shop in the local vicinity
of the colony). Thus, apart from the above-mentioned
categories, such interactions and engagement with
CTA create an additional set of representations for this
group of people. As many of my respondents hold dear
the statement from the earlier visits of the Dalai Lama,
“When Tibet gets free, we shall all return to Tibet.” These

encounters uphold the Tibetan belonging to the community, which gets reproduced in their everyday lives. One
of the most important visible representations of being a
Tibetan is the Tibetan Public School located in the Hawal
area within the ‘Tibetan Colony’.
The different representations from different actors
discussed above has shaped the group’s sense of belonging
and identity. The events mentioned above get intertwined
with the everyday of the Khache in Srinagar in such a
manner that poses some important questions towards
the state’s way of functioning. Even the state seems to be
perplexed; giving them permanent ration cards during
a certain period and then stopping their passports at
another. It seems like sometimes the global identity of the
Tibetan being a refugee gets ‘projected’ on this community
situated in Kashmir. These different categories percolate
into the community as they form groups like the Tibetan
Muslim Youth Federation (TMYF) and the Sangeen Youth
Federation (SYF), with the former perceived to have an
attachment with Tibetan identity and the latter towards
Kashmiri identity. The two groups’ differing views are
not in terms of history but in terms of the contemporary.
Respondents from both parties agreed to the importance
of their Tibetan heritage and their relation with their king,
the 14th Dalai Lama. But the problem lies at present where
due to unemployment and lack of better livelihood opportunities, there are frequent differences between the two
groups. The underlying tensions between the TMYF and
the SYF took the form of violence in 2012, which will be
discussed in the section that follows. It shows the current
messy state of the groups.
Crisis of Identity and Belonging: the Tibetan Public
School
The Tibetan Public School (TPS) is located in the ‘Tibetan
Colony’ at Badamwari, Hawal in Srinagar. The School is
recognized and affiliated with the Jammu and Kashmir
State Board of School Education. The Jammu and Kashmir
state acknowledges the community’s presence visibly, only
during the multiple visits of the Dalai Lama. The projection
of the Tibetan identity through such exchanges is what
some members of the SYF group fear. Another predominant fear that exists is that of being called a refugee
through the affiliation with the CTA, which would hinder
their chances of becoming a state subject. Individuals who
oppose this relationship with the 14th Dalai Lama and
the CTA perceive themselves as Kashmiri. Thus, when the
community’s identity is being constructed as Tibetan, it
disturbs some members’ notion of the self. Following the
same line of thought one of my respondents mentioned,
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“We have a fear that as the naming of the school changed
from Tibetan Muslim Children’s Educational Institute to
Tibetan Public School, in the same way, we would also one
day become a refugee.”
On the first visit of the Dalai Lama in 1975, the Tibetan
Muslim Refugee Welfare Association was formed which
looked after the well-being of the community. When
in Srinagar, “some elderly people started imparting
education and formed an Educational Committee to run
the Madrasa Islamia Tibetan at Id-Gah, Srinagar.” It was
through the financial assistance from the Dalai Lama and
from the Tibet Fund, New York, that “a handicraft center,
a co-operative shop and a school were established”. 6
At present however, only the school exists. The TMYF
was formed after the Tibetan Muslim Refugee Welfare
Association and it took over the school’s management
after the winter break of 1997. The school developed from
a small rented building at Baripora to a three-storied
building near one of the colonies. It is largely the funding
and possibly the monetary gains received by few that has
created rifts among the community members. Due to the
sensitive nature of the topic, the intricacies involved and
the confidence in which my respondents shared things
with me, I will not be able to go into certain specific details
with regards to the TPS and their funding, but I will try to
give the readers an idea about the situation.
Apart from CTA, the school also received some funds
from the Mongolian Tibetan Affairs Commission, Taipei.
It is unclear about what happened to the funding from
Taiwan, but it is believed to have stopped after the school
management committee (TMYF) sent them an official
letter informing them of the transfer of the management on March 1st 1997. Further, explaining the Taiwan
connection one of the respondents mentioned, “In search
of better opportunities many people from the community
went to Taiwan, Nepal, Saudi Arabia and through these
movements worked and also formed connections with the
Taiwanese Government.” Additionally, he believed that
the community, which was separated in the early days
because of the Taiwan government, was further separated
by the involvement of the CTA. A new unidentified group
was formed, but in local parlance, the community refers to
them as the ‘Kashmir group’, which did not believe in the
ideology of the two already existing groups (Dharamshala
and Taiwan). This group was working towards gaining
‘Jammu and Kashmir state subjectship’ for the whole of
the community. From this unidentified group emerged
the youth wing SYF. All of the members of the community largely know the presence of the three groups in the
community. In the local reference, the groups represent
a certain geographical undertone. They are referred to as
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the Dharamshala, Taiwan and Kashmir groups. The individual forms one’s identity through the social interactions
and the relations that one witnesses (Heise and MacKinnon
2010). The social interaction with the CTA and the relation
with the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, possibly led to
the division of the community.
My fieldwork discussions often revolved around the
tensions that were already brewing in the community
with regards to the divided status of being clubbed into
various categories. These worries came to the surface
during the two-day visit of the Dalai Lama in 2012 at
the TPS, when the school was vandalized. This incident
brought forth the tensions that have been present in the
community since the time the school had started taking
funds. The act of violence on the members of the management of the school and the school itself can be seen as the
result of the concerns resulting from different categorizations. Further, it becomes essential to look at the political
role of the CTA and how it has affected the community.
The process of being a Tibetan and preserving one’s identity, which began in 1975 (the first visit of the Dalai Lama),
had its effect to such an extent that the anxieties present
within the community escalated and found an expression
in his third visit to the community. The violence against
the TPS is itself a representation of the violence against
the Tibetan identity that some community members
hold close and some who do not want to adhere to. The
‘primary’ respondents of two different groups have voiced
their opinions as to how the incident unfolded, which
have been mentioned below.
Some members of the Khache community believes that
the Dharamshala group handles the management of
the school, while the Kashmir and Taiwanese groups
are perceived as having joined hands to overthrow the
Dharamshala group. In the given account the respondent
referred to both Kashmir and Taiwan groups as ‘they’:
The incident took place after the Tibetan Parliament Speaker spoke. Some group of the people
started vandalizing the school building, and they
called the police. They misled the police and in
the end, captured the management of the school.
Everyone knew I was looking after the academic
programme here, and hence I was taken into police
custody. But I called the Private Secretary of His
Holiness, and I was not harmed at all.
Next, the Divisional Commissioner started the
enquiry. We took the matter till the high court
because they had bribed the tehsildars. During that
time the jurisdiction summoned some of our management members claiming that we have stolen

control of the school and if you do not leave the
school in a week’s time then the case will be handled legally. (Rahim Khan, 47, Male, Tibetan Public
School, 17th September 2015)
A respondent from another group (Kashmir and Taiwan)
observed:
Everyone from the community was attending the
cultural programme in the school. The violence
broke out when someone from SYF questioned the
school management to show documents about how
the funds are disbursed in the school. Basically
what we wanted was transparency. As they refused
to reveal the records, arguments started. Next,
some people who were present began breaking
doors and windowpanes of the school. To resolve
this dispute, the Additional Deputy Commissioner
headed a committee. I reached along with some
members on behalf of the SYF, and we explained
our stance that we were not refugees, we were
citizens, they maintained that they were Tibetan
refugees, they were related to the Dalai Lama.
The Additional Deputy Commissioner passed on the
responsibility to the tehsildar [tax officers accompanied with revenue inspectors], who proposed
a community referendum be affected, and whoever gained the majority of the votes would take
authority of the school. It was then that these
(Dharamshala) people went to the High Court,
obtained a stay order, and slapped a case for me.
They do not want to vote because then the school
would come in the hands of the community. And I
did not go ahead because there is nobody here to
take responsibility for the school. If tomorrow the
quality of the school falls, it will only be bad for the
community, so it is better to stay like this. I have no
personal end to seek here; I do not have livelihood
worries. So, I just let it be. (Naseer Shah, 50, Male,
Hawal, 10th August 2015)
In the two narratives, one can see how the incident is seen
from two different perspectives. Recalling what happened
further, the second respondent said, “After the incident
took place, the Dharamshala speaker of the parliament
called me and had an interaction with me, he said that you
are so weak that even after having citizenship, you are
asking for assistance from us, refugees.” For the second
respondent, it further heightened the distinction of being
different from the Tibetan, thus projecting another group.
As the community needed help, they took aid from
whomever they received it, not realizing the consequences

it might have for the community later. Summing up these
chaotic encounters for survival of the group in Kashmir,
one of my respondents questioned the very nature of how
categories are produced:
One has to be well sustained in life for ordinary
men to think about humanity. When we repatriated
here, we did not have any job, no proper livelihood,
people were anxious. I heard that aids were coming
for the community from Dharamshala and Taiwan.
Some people among us opposed the idea of accepting funds and some did not. (Gulam Rasul, 70, Male,
Hazratbal, 13th August)
Amidst this entire struggle for survival, some members of
the community tried to achieve a uniform political identity
addressing all their different categories with—Repatriated
Indian Muslims of Kashmiri Origin from Tibet in the year
2005. But amidst the differences in ideological positions
within the community, this group became defunct within
a short period. In due course of time, these different
groups brought along a feeling of bitterness within the
community members, and their unresolved issues resulted
in violence as encountered above. The only thing that
has somewhat remained stable (though evolving through
different regions) in their messy states, is their religion,
which ultimately forms a major part of their survival,
existence, and everyday lives.
Hijrat: Narrative of Belonging in Movement
“Hum hijrat karke yahaan aye (We have performed hijrat
and travelled here)” (Saleema Sheikh, 60, Female, Hawal,
1st September 2015)
Most narratives began with the reference of hijrat—the
emblematic religious migration—as a faithful act in itself
(in this case, escaping a religion-intolerant political space
in post-1950s Tibet). “Apne din ki hifazat karo (Learn to
protect your religion).” The larger historical and cultural
context of hijrat by the Prophet of Islam was frequently
invoked by respondents to locate their migration and the
circumstances under which they migrated. “Ab wahi baat
hai, hum log hijrat karke aye hain (It is the same story, we
have undertaken hijrat and we have come here).” Thus,
the notion of hijrat has become a signifying factor in the
everyday life of the community.
Another respondent, who was 60 then, owns a shop in the
Tibetan Colony and used the same phrase to respond to
the query on why they moved from Tibet. In his words:
“Hum hijrat karke yahaan aye (We have undertaken hijrat
and have come here).” He explained that as there was
no freedom of religion in Tibet in the 1960s, they left
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the place and moved to save their religion. It is hijrat as
a concept, which is used by the people to make sense
of having been protected from any eventuality. Talking
about the recent floods in Kashmir in 2014 and the Nepal
earthquake in 2015, one of my respondents mentioned:
Even prophet Muhammad had to do hijrat to save
Islam. And the person who does hijrat will be saved
from any unforeseen circumstances. Look at the
recent floods that happened in Srinagar, did any
of our community people suffer? Also, during the
Nepal earthquake, lots of people were killed. Did
anything happen to our community members? No,
it is because we did hijrat, that Allah has saved us
from such natural disasters.
Such was the insistence on the movement to save religion that the first mosque built was named as ‘The Hijrat
Mosque’, in the EidGah Colony, which is locally referred to
as the ‘Tibetian Refugee Colony’. During the initial years
after having relocated to Srinagar, an imam from Nadwa
Ulama, (an Islamic Institution in Lucknow formally called
Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama) came and reminded the
people that they must never forget that they had come
(to Srinagar) to save their religion. There is a possibility
that the only thing that has remained constant for them
is their religion and that is what significantly shapes their
sense of belonging. Further, the acceptance and invocation
of the Islamic concept of hijrat allows the community to
see migration as not just an external event, but a sort of
spiritual journey. At present, it would not be surprising to
see members of the family going to the Tablighi Jamaat, a
preaching movement reaffirming basic principles of Islam,
for days or even months.
Thus, we see people bring up hijrat as an idea that helps
them cope. Further, it validates their movement from
Tibet to their ancestral land of Kashmir. Their networks
that span across different regions find resonance in the
use of this concept to make sense of their uncertainty.
The core doctrine of hijrat is the idea of preserving
one’s religion resulting in the ultimate act of faith and
sincerity towards Islam (Casewitt 1998: 114). However,
such geographical movements always put their own
pulls and pressures for change. Many practices that were
adopted in Tibet were stopped without any explanation
(Gaute 2015: 53). Religion which seemed the only thing
that was constant for this group has also evolved through
the local and global influences. Although the veneration
and celebration of Sufi saints is a widespread practice in
Kashmir, but it seems that the Khache have given up this
traditional practice in pursuit of forging a new identity for
the community.
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Conclusion
“Do not try to separate the fabrics of the cloth, everything
will fall apart.” (Gulam Rasul, 70, Male, Hazratbal, 21st
August 2015)
When I first entered the Hawal colony, a big worn-out gate
welcomed me. It was called Sangeen Darwaza. Identical
houses lined together, but some had more levels than the
others, perhaps an indication of the social class of the
particular tenant. The geography was similar to other
neighborhoods of Srinagar, but on closer inspection, you
would find kids sitting on the roadside, chattering in
Tibetan, while using some Kashmiri words in between.
Young women walked past me in groups, wearing salwar
kameez, giggling; an old woman sat on the threshold,
enjoying the sun. She was wearing a chuba.
Entering the house of my hosts, Khatiza Kharmurah, an
80-year-old woman welcomed me in. She was wearing a
chuba and a headscarf. Walking barefoot on the wooden
floor, lined heavily with carpets of Tibetan wool, we sat
down while lunch was being spread out in the adjacent
dining room. As we were sitting and waiting, sipping butter
tea, I asked, “Khatiza la, (don’t you feel hot in) chuba?” She
smiled and replied, “Yeh toh hamara traditional dress hain
na, Tibetan honey ka nishani (This is our traditional dress,
a marker of us being Tibetan).” Perhaps the chuba and the
headscarf were her ways of keeping Tibet alive in everyday
life in Kashmir—the Tibet where she grew up, was being
embodied and lived with here in Srinagar, I wondered.
Lunch was served. As we both walked into the wooden
dining room, the sumptuous spread caught my eyes. The
fumes of wazwaan (multi-course meal in Kashmiri cuisine)
mixed seamlessly with that of thukpa (Tibetan noodle soup)
and momo (dumplings) in the early autumn afternoon air.
How does one write about everyday lives that are so
complex and connected? Regions, regimes, religion,
narratives of belonging, politics, self, identity, mingling
like smoke in the afternoon air. Where does one end and
the other begin? Everyday life itself is an art of existing,
encounters with categories, messy negotiations, and
adjustments made with one’s surroundings. As Anna Tsing
(2005) would describe, and as we have seen in our case,
region, religion, routines, and rules are themselves co-produced through these encounters, which ultimately shape
the everyday identities and practices. There is no clear
demarcation between these categories which themselves
are not fixed, but in movement, as has become clear (or
perhaps, unclear?) through various elaborations in the
article. This makes neat categorization impossible. Calling
them Tibetan may deny the performed aspirations of being

Kashmiri, claims to an ancestry, and sense of history, if not
access to possibilities of dignified livelihood. At the same
time, calling them Kashmiri may possibly deny a cherished
Tibet, that is remembered, imagined, and performed in
everyday food, language, gestures, and habits and maybe
even aspired. The Khache may be Kashmiri, may be Tibetan,
may be both or none, perhaps even everything, living here
in Srinagar, or there in Lhasa, or in Nepal, Kalimpong,
Darjeeling maintaining an ummah across regions and
regimes. Words have the capacity to make worlds as they
move across different time and space (Gluck and Tsing
2009: 3). Further, words move, pick up new meanings,
histories, and stories. As such, as I have argued, perhaps a
geographically and politically neutral term Khache is less
problematic for representation. Khache is less loaded, due
to its non-association with any particular center of power,
as such it is perhaps more open to movement, change
and more nuanced representation, affects, respectful of
trans-national agencies of ‘staying together’.

Me: Do you remember what I had asked you when we were small?
Friend: No. Indeed it has been long. Hey, was it about the Losar
thing or Tibetan Muslim?
Me: (With a smile in my face) Yes, you do remember. I have a
better idea now. Let me start by telling you about the history of
my community.

I need to make two admissions before I end. Firstly, I
acknowledge that there are not enough voices of women
in the article, as I would have preferred. The question of
gender in the above discussions of representation and
language is an important one and will be the subject of
my forthcoming articles. Secondly, the journey of writing
this article has been intensely personal and stressful.
Most of the respondents I quote above are relatives and
acquaintances who represent a wide spectrum of opinions
and positions on these issues. As an ethnographer, a young
unmarried female, I have tried my best to search, hear, and
gather from the widest range of stories possible and have
made a careful and honest attempt to assemble my own
understanding of reality. Yet, as one who can publish her
own representation, words that may reach far and wide, I
put myself in a position of privilege and peril.
		 *

*

*

In the meantime, five years have passed since I have
seen my childhood friend, who we met at the start of
this article. He has a shop now on the 10th Mile Road
in Kalimpong on the lower end, where probably many
traders used to visit in the earlier days. I am in Kalimpong
again. As he sees me coming, my friend gets up, and we
share a cordial handshake of being old classmates. I tell
him how much I miss the place and am thinking of coming
back for good. We discuss business, friends (who moved
away and some who stayed back), talked about everything
under the sun. And next followed a conversation something like this:

HIMALAYA Volume 38, Number 2 | 37

Anisa Bhutia is a PhD Scholar at Tata Institute of
Social Sciences, Mumbai. She has been working on the
entanglements of Islam and Tibet since 2012. Her MPhil
dissertation looks at the intricacies between the relation
of Islam and Tibet through the so-called ‘Tibetan Muslims’
settled in Srinagar, Kashmir. Her doctorate research is a
study of goods, trade, economy, and cosmopolitanism in
Kalimpong town in the eastern Himalaya. She is a recipient
of the DAAD Exchange Scholarship to the University of
Münster and the Inlaks Research Fellowship to King’s India
Institute, London. She is an aspiring anthropologist who
works on border studies, mobility, connections, migration,
region, memory, and belonging.
First and foremost the author would like to thank Tridibesh Dey
for helping navigate the way around this topic. The article would
not have taken its current form without our many conversations,
dialogues, and his insights. Further, the author would like to thank
the editors of HIMALAYA journal for making possible this special
issue of Himalayan Ummah. Furthermore, the author would also
like to thank the two anonymous reviewers who helped strengthen
the article through their rigorous feedback. Additionally, the
author extends gratitude to all the academics whose conversations
have helped develop this work. Not to forget her community
spanning all throughout the Himalayas and beyond without whose
sincere conversations and cooperation, this article could not have
assumed its current form. Last but definitely not least; the author
would like to thank her family and friends.

4. In White Paper I, the two Notes that specifically talked
about the treatment of the group as Indian Nationals or
Tibetans are: Letter from the Consul-General of India
in Lhasa to the Foreign Bureau in Tibet, 13 May 1959
and Letter from the Director of the Foreign Bureau in
Tibet to the Consul-General of India in Lhasa, 17 July
1959. Similarly, in White Paper II there were two notes
specifically on this issue: Note given by the Ministry of
External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in
India, 24 September 1959 and Note given by the Ministry
of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in
India, 29 October 1959.
5. The names of my respondents have been changed for
their protection.
6. This information has been retrieved from the
document that was shared by some members from
the community, which outlined a brief history of the
school titled ‘Tibetan School in Srinagar under Different
Managements since 1960s’.
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